LIBOR Gets a Licking - Why Pensions Care

According to "The Lowdown on LIBOR" (May 29, 2008) Businessweek reporters Ben Levisohn and Lauren Young write that $150 trillion is the "value of financial products with interest rates tied to" the London Interbank Offer Rate. In pensionland, this important benchmark rate shows up in a variety of ways.

A plan sponsor that employs swaps to manage interest rate risk often plays the role of Floating Rate Payor. As LIBOR rises, so too does its cash flow obligation as part of the periodic derivative trade settlement. Hedge funds may report a return that shows a shrinking basis point spread as LIBOR takes an upturn, challenging pension funds to explain "sub-par" performance to relevant constituencies. Equity values may be depressed if issuers in which a pension fund invests depend on short-term loans tied to LIBOR. Higher rates may force delinquincies for adjustable rate mortgage borrowers, impacting the price, liquidity and riskiness of some mortgage-backed securities, These are just a few of the LIBOR-related pain points for pension investors.

The saga doesn't end with volatility and escalating levels but rather continues with the process of rate-setting itself. Fearing reprisal from capital markets as credit conditions worsen, banks are thought to be quoting rates that are lower than where they are actually able to borrow from peers. In response, the British Bankers' Association undertook a thorough review of the group of banks that determine daily LIBOR levels, used in turn to price loans, settle derivative trades and/or value securities for an assortment of currencies. The following banks are used to determine U.S. dollar LIBOR:

  • Bank of America
  • Barclays Bank plc
  • Citibank NA
  • Credit Suisse
  • Deutsche Bank AG
  • HBOS
  • HSBC
  • JP Morgan Chase
  • Lloyds TSB Bank plc
  • Rabobank
  • Royal Bank of Canada
  • The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd
  • The Norinchukin Bank
  • The Royal Bank of Scotland Group
  • USB AG
  • West LB AG.

According to a May 30, 2008 news release, a British Bankers' Association sponsored "FX and Money Markets Advisory Panel" has responsibilities to strengthen the oversight of BBA LIBOR. More details are expected shortly. Click to read "BBA Libor Panels."

Arkansas Teachers Sue Company Directors for Risk Taking

According to business vox populist Gretchen Morgenson, a Los Angeles federal judge plans to hold mortgage company executives accountable by allowing a lawsuit to proceed. In "Judge Says Countrywide Officers Must Face Suit by Shareholders" (New York Times, May 15, 2008), Morgenson quotes Christa Clark, chief attorney for lead plaintiff, Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, as urging institutional investors to recognize a "duty to seek recourse when a company's directors engage in practices that are not in the best interests of shareholders."

It is impossible to know all facts at this stage, let alone guilt. Only ensuing testimony will shed light on whether Countrywide's CEO and about a dozen directors and officers are deemed culpable. According to the complaint (not yet included in the national judiciary's repository), those described as in the know were allegedly liquidating their personal holdings while making "misleading" public statements about the financial health of the company.

Two things are notable about this case. First, it is yet another indication of the power of institutional investors, in the aftermath of the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Second, questions remain about whether, and to what extent, other boards will find themselves defending suspicious practices. The outcome of this lawsuit portends greater focus on who should be held responsible for financial practices. So far, the outcome is mixed with respect to the sub-prime blame game.

The Fire & Police Pension Association of Colorado ("FPPAC"), Louisiana Municipal Police Employees Retirement System ("LAMPERS"), Central Laborers Pension Fund, and the Mississippi Public Employees Retirement System ("MPERS") are listed as additional plaintiffs.

Lowballing LIBOR May Cost Pensions Plenty

According to Wall Street Journal reporter Carrick Mollenkamp ("Libor Surges After Scrutiny Does, Too - April 18, 2008), the British Bankers' Association is moving ahead to investigate the veracity of self-reported cost-of-funds numbers. The fear is that banks are paying more to borrow in the short run than they want to admit. If peers discover the truth, bank borrowers may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage. Non-borrowers will feel the pinch too as will swap and over-the-counter fixed income option counterparties and those trading the Eurodollar futures contract. The London Interbank Offer Rate ("LIBOR") is a common base rate for most short-term loans and derivative instrument contracts.

American regulators are worried too as market pundits predict that U.S. dollar LIBOR rates are likely to spiral. Just last week, three-month LIBOR loan rates rose to 2.8175% per annum, up from 2.7335%, "the biggest increase since the three-month rate rose 0.12 percentage point on August 9" when BNP Paribas prevented investors from withdrawing money from several of their funds. The current level is reported at "its highest" since March 13 when news came out about Bear Stearns.

A rising LIBOR makes swap-driven Liability-Driven Investing ("LDI") strategies more expensive for Fixed Rate Receivors - Floating Rate Payors. In addition, if quarterly checks indeed differ from estimated projections, pensions may eschew LDI strategies as too difficult to evaluate for accounting or risk management purposes.

Interestingly, quotation problems seem to be contained to U.S. dollar LIBOR situations and not other currencies such as the Euro.

Valuation - Getting on Track

As an Accredited Valuation Analyst and long-time advocate of the notion that effective risk management and valuation go hand in hand, the release of two reports that emphasize good process in these areas is welcome news. See "Principles and Best Practices for Hedge Fund Investors" and "Best Practices for the Hedge Fund Industry." Click to read "PWG Private-Sector Committees Release Best Practicies for Hedge Fund Participants" (April 15, 2008) where "PWG" stands for the President's Working Group.

While I agree with Peter Schwartz that self-regulation and market discipline is ideal, I'd like to think that calls for reform are positive reactions to problems rather than "desperate" pre-emptive strikes against statutory mandates. Is that naive? Perhaps but hope springs eternal. (Read "Valuation is the Heart of the Matter," reprinted in "Money House of Cards or Disciplined Approach?" - April 17, 2008)

Where I part company with my colleague is that I believe one can (absent a once in a lifetime event) value complex securities if they are equipped with an analytical toolbox. If we peek inside, "hammers and nails" would include: (a) reasonable assumptions (b) appropriate and tested models (c) understandable and available data (d) identification of relevant risk factors that drive value (e) methodology that can be explained to others and reflects relevant economic considerations (f) disciplined, systematic process and (g) common sense.

Ultimately, value equals price when a willing (and hopefully informed) buyer and seller agree on terms. Until then, should we surrender to what some deem as villainous fair value accounting rules or roll up our shirt sleeves and get to work, acknowledging that a calculated "value" may differ from an eventual price?

I opt for the latter because I believe action beats passivity (though some may say nein to investing in the first place). Indeed there are numerous occasions that require an opinion of value for "official" reasons (tax reporting, account redemption, fund creation, determination of hedge size and so on.) What worries me is when alternative fund managers adopt an arbitrary stance or embrace a philosophy that discourages attempts to apply reason, discipline and care.

  • Example One - Two or more appraisers may reasonably disagree on an exact identical DLOM ("discount for lack of marketability") for a particular economic interest. Yet a careful analysis of what contributes to a possible liquidity event is far superior to the X% times number of years formula in use by some alternative fund managers. 
  • Example Two - Appraisers cost a fund (or its investors, depending on which party pays) because they charge a fee to render independent, objective third party assessments.  Are pensions, endowments and foundations better off by blithely relying on marks provided by traders, knowing that they are often compensated based on reported performance (inducing an inherent conflict of interest as a result)?
  • Example Three - Should we accept that some instruments truly cannot be valued or instead identify economic and non-economic factors that impact the ability of an owner to eventually sell? Should we ignore emerging mechanisms that create markets in all sorts of "hard to value" business interests such as someone's client list or their employee stock options? 

Mr. Schwartz is certainly right to warn that some situations are challenging at best. As this blog has emphasized (perhaps ad nauseum), suitability assessment is a critical first step. It makes no sense to invest other people's money (plan participants) or encourage direct allocation (as with 401(k) plans) unless decision-makers truly understand risk drivers (qualitative, quantitative, economic, non-economic).

This blog will continue to address valuation issues. Your feedback is welcome. Drop us a line.

Editor's Note: Check out www.securitiesmosaic.com and the family of related websites. It's well worth your time. 

Pension Funds Ask - "Who is Responsible for Risk Oversight?"

In "Bear's board was busy elsewhere," Financial News reporter Jeff Nash (March 31, 2008) writes that the investment bank's board has been busy, with three individuals doing work for "at least four other public companies" and two "of those three extremely busy directors" doing double duty as members of the risk committee. Corporate governance pundits add that outside distractions do little to help business fiduciaries carry out critical risk oversight duties.

Wall Street Journal reporter George Anders likewise addresses the question of where the buck stops, or if it arrived at all. In "Wall Street Housecleaning May Bypass Boardroom," the executive director of the $12 billion Illinois State Board of Investment, William R. Atwood puzzles over the involvement of directors as relates to sub-prime losses, wondering if "directors at big banks and Wall Street firms share some responsibility for what has gone wrong." Others quoted in the April 2, 2008 article counter that it may be ill-advised to unseat veteran directors. New appointees face a steep learning curve that exposes a company to risk of another kind.

The courts will surely play a prominent role in determining who pays (if at all) as shareholders and pension plan participants file lawsuits aplenty.

Emotions, Trading Risk and the Twinkie Defense

Following on the heels of our March 15 post about emotions and retirement planning, another just published article addresses the role of the brain with respect to risk proclivity. In "The Science of Risk-Taking," TIME reporter Kate Stinchfield writes that thrill-seeking has a chemical payoff. Research suggests that higher risk tolerance relates to the reabsorption of dopamine, a neurotransmitter. Serotonin is a factor as well. Normal levels prevent erratic behavior. Testosterone is yet another consideration, with lower (higher) amounts linked to risk aversion (taking). Stinchfield quotes Professor Marvin Zuckerman (University of Delaware) as saying that "high-sensation seekers tend to underestimate the risk."

So does this mean that current excesses of financial risk-taking are tied to unusual brain activity? Can "bad" body chemistry interfere with the prudent process of implementing and monitoring risk controls?

"Sorry your honor, my chemical levels made me take wild, zany risks with other people's money." This sounds like the financial equivalent of the Twinkie Defense.

UK Pension Gains Wiped Out

Even British comic book hero Union Jack may not be able to save the day for some UK pension plans. According to data just released by the Pension Protection Fund, the net funding status for nearly 8,000 private defined benefit plans widened to 97.5 billion pound sterling. Worse than the 80.8 billion GBP gap reported for January 2008, this February 2008 number is deemed "highest since June 2003" and represents the fourth consecutive monthly gap. Another telling indicator of problems is the news that "In February 2008, the total surpluses of schemes in surplus fell to £32.6 billion from £37.3 billion1 at the end of January 2008." Twelve months ago, the "aggregate surplus of all schemes in surplus stood at £68.6 billion." Click to review the Pension Protection Fund data report.

Citing anemic equity performance and falling bond yields as the culprits, the report's authors add that lower bond yields resulted in a 8.1% rise in aggregate liabilities "while weaker equities have reduced assets by 1.5%." Noteworthy are the results of a survey commissioned by the PPF and carried out by KPMG that show that few respondents (defined benefit plans considered "large") employ liability hedging techniques. The chart that maps funding status to percent of liabilities seems to support a widely held belief that "where funding is severely low the schemes need to take a certain degree of investment risk to help get back to full funding, given the PPF is insuring a certain level of benefits."

Does this mean that regulatory subsidies discourage hedging? If so, the UK would not be unique in terms of a rational but perverse response to changed incentives. (The notion of unintended consequences is one of the free market economic arguments against regulation, especially when "innocents" end up paying the bill.)

Click to access the January 2008 survey entitled "Pension Protection Fund: Investment Strategy and LDI Survey."

On a related note, a survey of US and Canadian plan sponsors, focused on their pension risk management practices, is due out shortly. A collaborative effort on the part of the Society of Actuaries and Pension Governance, LLC, the results support those of the aforementioned UK survey with respect to lower than expected amount of hedging (of both assets and liabilities).

Pensions and Liquidity Squeeze

More than a few people have declared the beginning of the end. A reference to halcyon market conditions, it looks like they are right (at least for now). A flurry of headlines address what this blog author has been saying all along. Watch the collateral, assess liquidity risk and take stress testing seriously. Where does one begin?

1. On March 5, a Pension Governance sponsored webinar (Fiduciary Risk, Trading Controls and External Asset Manager Selection) emphasized to need to be wary of the risks you don't know and manage the ones you can measure. In his remarks about global bank and pension regulation, Mr. Gavin Watson (Institutional Business Strategy Head, RiskMetrics Group) correctly pointed out that risk management is no longer a luxury. Basel II seeks to better link capital reserves with banks' economic risks. UCITS III (Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities) requires asset managers to have a daily risk monitoring program that is easy to understand. Pension plans are not immune from new rules. Risk forecasting is a statutory reality for Dutch plans. UK plans must take underfunding risk into account or pay a punitive levy. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 in the US imposes a variety of rules that relate to fiduciary risk mitigation, including the selection of a proper advisor for 401(k) plan investment selection. Mr. Anthony Turner (Principal - Financial Tracking Technologies) talked about the need to examine managers' holdings and track deviations from approved limits.

2. In a separate webinar on March 6, I urged audience members to pay attention to the quality, quantity, price behavior and transferability restrictions attached to pledged collateral. Part of "Liquidity Risk Managemenft," hosted by Knowledge Congress and co-sponsored by Pension Governance, LLC, my presentation addressed liquidity red flags, including but not limited to the following:

• Undue Concentration in a Few Number of Holdings
• Low Trading Volume
• Infrequent Trading
• Limited Number of Market Participants
• Contractual Limitations on Whether, How and When Withdrawals Can be Made
• Volatile Market
• Form of Withdrawals, if Permitted
• Correlation Changes
• Contagion 

3. In today's paper, famed New York Times reporter Gretchen Morgenson refers to investors as guests in Hotel California since "they have checked into an investment they can never leave." Referring to auction rate notes (debt instruments with long or no maturities that reset weekly), author of "As Good as Cash Until It's Not" describes how this market has screeched to a halt in recent days. Finding few bidders, mostly municipal issuers worry about growing budget gaps. Investors, on the other hand, are left holding the bag after investing in what they perceived to be relatively "low risk" securities.

4. In "Hedge Funds Frozen Shut," Business Week journalist Matthew Goldstein reports that "Since November at least 24 hedge funds have barred or limited investors from taking their money out, tying up tens of billions of dollars for an indefinite period. Among them: GPS Partners, a $1 billion fund that bets mainly on natural gas pipelines; Pursuit Capital Partners, a $650 million portfolio with troubled debt; and Alcentra European Credit, a $500 million fund that owns slumping loans used to finance private equity buyouts. For those institutional investors who failed to read the fine print allowing managerial discretion, these lock-outs are bad news. Arguably, hedge funds want to prevent a mass exodus of their investors for several reasons. First, a drain on assets makes it harder to recover losses (if possible at all). Second, fees drop as the size of their portfolio falls due to redemptions and sub-par performance. Making matters worse, prime brokers are turning off the money tap, create illiquidity problems for hedge fund managers at the precise moment when they need cash to stay in the game. Goldstein suggests that redemption restrictions may be postponing an inevitable collapse for some hedge funds.

I'd say "take two aspirin and revisit the situation in the morning" but that solution fars short of what looks to be rough times ahead.

Chile Pension Reform Adds to Foreign Investments

In "Chile set to boost foreign investment," Financial News reporter Johanna Symmons (January 28, 2008) describes a proposed law that increases maximum international holdings from the current 40 percent to 80 percent. This means that the half dozen authorized private fund administration companies will have more latitude in how they manage the country's mandatory individual savings accounts. When approved, non-Chilean holdings could rise as much as USD 50 billion. In addition, reform will add to retirement plans of impoverished citizens, "funded by windfalls from copper production." Credit goes to President Michelle Bachelet who identified the need for change as "her administration's most important task."

This blogger is proud to say that she worked as a financial risk management expert on an official fact-finding team in early 2006. Led by Dr. Roberto Rocha (World Bank), colleagues and report co-authors included Mr. Graeme Thompson (former Australian regulatory chief and now pension consultant) and Dr. Eduardo Walker (Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile). If you are interested in learning more, know that pension professionals from around the world will be presenting at The 4th Contractual Savings Conference: Supervisory and Regulatory Issues In Private Pensions and Life Insurance. Hosted by the World Bank and occurring on April 2 through 4, 2008, the discussions will emphasize the "brave new world" of pension risk management. Yours truly is presenting a session entiled "Risk Management of Pension Funds: A Practitioners View."

If you are unable to join us in Washington, DC, I invite you to read about what other countries are doing in the area of pension reform for different types of plans. Chile is a particularly interesting case inasmuch as politicians and public policy leaders often reference this Latin American system as a noteworthy and innovative model. Think of it as a national 401(k) plan of sorts. While not perfect (no system is), many people like having their own account rather than being part of a "pay as you go" system. For more information, visit the site for the Superintendency of Pension Fund Administrators and click on the English overview.

AIG Auditors 1, Traders 0 - Round 1

February 11 was a bit of an equity rollercoaster. Reports of another big price gap were to blame. According to Reuters, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, external auditors for AIG, "concluded that the company had a material weakness in its internal control over financial reporting relating to the fair valuation of credit default swap portfolio obligations of AIG Financial Products Corp." Those in the know estimate the unrealized valuation loss relating to credit default swaps as being close to $5 billion, much bigger than originally believed. The stock closed down 12 percent lower. (Click to read "AIG discloses hole in derivatives valuation" by Lilla Zuill.)

Several questions come to mind, not the least of which is whether internal auditors came to the same conclusion at the same time and by the same route. How did the outside auditors decide on the adjustment? What models did they use? (AIG's Form 8-K, filed with the SEC as of February 11, 2008, mentions the Binomial Expansion Technique and Monte Carlo Simulation.) How often did auditors and traders kick the proverbial tires? On the business development front, how will this news impact organizations on the other side of AIG trades? Will they ask for more collateral? Will trade size fall to reflect a reappraisal of default risk?

To be sure, AIG is not the only name in the headlines. Irrespective of any particular company, and as we've mentioned many times before, pension funds are duly exposed when they transact derivatives, buy financial company stock or bonds or allocate money to multi-purpose behemoths. Now is not the time to be shy about asking tough questions as regards risk management and valuation policies and procedures of firms such as AIG. This holds true even when a consultant is engaged. Legal experts remind. Fiduciary oversight remains.

Awhile ago, this blogger authored "Asset Valuation: Not a Trivial Pursuit" for the Institute of Internal Auditors. Topics discussed include model risk, model validation and the internal auditor's role. Also check out "The Role of the Financial Expert in Valuation of Derivative Instruments." Yes Virginia, there is lots of litigation as a result of markdowns, disclosure questions and risk management process (or lack thereof). 

On March 5, 2008 (in case you missed our earlier announcement), Pension Governance, LLC is proud to sponsor a webinar entitled "Fiduciary Risk, Trading Controls and External Asset Manager Selection." Persons who attend this 75-minute webinar will learn the following:

  • What Constitutes "Must Have" Elements of Effective Risk Management Systems
  • Ways to Detect Deviation from Management Style and/or Excess Position Concentration
  • Red Flags Regarding Possible Rogue Trading
  • Industry Best Practices for Trading Controls and Lessons Learned About What to Avoid.

We hope to have you join us!

You Said What About Risk?

World business glitterati leave Davos, Switzerland with a renewed vigor to tackle problems du jour. Not surprisingly, those who attended the World Economic Forum had plenty to say about financial markets and risk.  

According to Clara Ferreira-Marques and Sue Thomas of Reuters, Raymond McDaniel, Chairman and CEO of Moody's, declared that "A lot of things could have been done better - some are the responsibility of rating agencies, some of other participants in the market." Guillermo Ortiz, Governor of the Central Bank of Mexico, urged more transparency. "The complexity of the products and financial innovation made it more difficult -- even the regulators failed to understand. It was an exercise in collective confusion."

For those who stayed home, a trip to the conference website is telling. Part of a panel about financial markets, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, described "low interest rates, high liquidity, a breakdown in credit and risk management practices, and a shortcoming in US financial regulation and supervision" as culprits. Central bankers concluded that the "causes behind the latest financial crisis were complex" with "some time before regulators and market players can fully grasp what went wrong."  A session moderated by CNBC's Maria Bartiromo (who interviewed me about pension investing on June 14, 2007) included a comment by Walter Kielholz, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Credit Suisse about the struggle for banks to generate returns even though "for four to five years, financial institutions have believed there is too much of an appetite for risk in the market."

Here are a few of my favorite "you don't say" quotes about risk.

  • “The only perfect hedge is in a Japanese garden.” (Gene Rotberg, former treasurer, World Bank)
  • “Due to my inexperience, I placed a great deal of reliance on the advice of market professionals…" (Robert Citron, former treasurer, Orange County, California)
  • "There is no such thing as a free lunch." (Milton Friedman, Nobel Prize winning economist and author)

If you know of any interesting statements about financial risk (including those which defy rational belief), we'd love to receive them. Similarly, it would be great to get your feedback about the role of regulation. Do we need more rules to govern investing? Click here to send us an email.

 

 


Fiduciary Risk, Trading Controls and External Asset Manager Selection - New Webinar

Pension Governance, LLC is registered with CFA Institute as an Approved Provider of professional development programs. This program is pending approval for 1.5 PD credit hours as granted by CFA Institute.

Join us on March 3, 2008 from 11 am to 12:15 pm EST for a lively discussion about ways to mitigate transaction risk.

Description: Fiduciary duties mandate oversight of external asset manager selection. This includes a proper vetting of trading-related controls and the process used to determine limits, authorized persons, style drift, early warning signals and liquidity traps.

Who Should Attend: Plan sponsors, plan administrators, pension consultants, board members with responsibilities for selection of investment fiduciary advisors, regulators, bankers, mutual fund and hedge fund managers with (or seeking to attract) pension fund investors

Learning Points: Topics covered during this 75 minute online and telephone event are shown below.

  • What Constitutes "Must Have" Elements of Effective Risk Management Systems
  • Ways to Detect Deviation from Management Style and/or Excess Position Concentration
  • Red Flags Regarding Possible Rogue Trading
  • Industry Best Practices for Trading Controls
  • Lessons Learned About What to Avoid

Speakers:

  • Dr. Susan M. Mangiero, AIFA, AVA, CFA, FRM - Moderator
    President
    Pension Governance, LLC
  • Mr. W. Anthony Turner - Speaker
    Principal
    Financial Tracking, LLC
  • Mr. Gavin W. Watson – Speaker
    Business Manager for Asset Managers, Pensions and Insurance
    RiskMetrics Group, Inc.

To register, click here. There is a modest charge of $125 per person. If you are interested in a discounted rate for multiple attendees, email PG-Info@pensiongovernance.com.

Fraud in France - Time to Take Our Webinar on Trading Controls?

The news broke on January 24, 2008 that a rogue trader at Societe Generale was allegedly responsible for nearly US $7 billion (4.9 billion euros) in fraudulent transactions. Hours later, Bank of France governor, Christian Noyer, tried to allay fears. Refuting any connection between sub-prime exposure and the situation at hand, Reuters reports Noyer as saying that "nobody could have foreseen the loss" but acknowledged that risk controls should have been a barrier. "Today we have seen there was a glitch in the system that was exploited by someone who I think got around five successive risk control systems." See "Bank of France head reassures after SocGen fraud" (January 24, 2008).

When contacted for comments by www.pensionriskmatters.com, Mr. Tony Turner, principal with Financial Tracking, LLC asks - "Who was watching the store and who was watching the watchers? This highlights the need for automated and consistent monitoring and alerting."

What's interesting (at least based on preliminary public information) is that the identified bad player was supposedly an expert in operations and able to use that knowledge to his advantage. Many questions arise. 

  • How should back office, middle office and front office controls change to avoid a repeat occurrence?
  • What role do humans play with respect to monitoring computer systems thought to be otherwise safe from attack?
  • Who should ultimately bear responsibility for le rogue trader?
  • Is this type of fraud a "black swan" event or can we expect more trouble?
  • What can pension fund decision-makers do to better vet their banks' risk controls?

This will not be the last time we read about fraud and its potentially devastasting impact on related parties.

The Cow Theory of Pension Investing

Free market advocate and famed author Ayn Rand is said to have explained communism with the use of an old Russian tale. It goes like this.

  • In a liberalized environment, Farmer A gets a new cow. Farmer B admires his neighbor's addition and works hard to buy a cow of his own.
  • In a state-run society, Farmer A gets a new cow. Farmer B realizes that he must work to pay taxes to feed Farmer A's cow. With a fixed wealth pie, levies diminish Farmer B's money pot, thereby giving Farmer B an incentive to destroy what he must support. He plots to get rid of Ms. Moo, making Farmer A worse off and arguably costing Farmer B time and money to pursue his wicked ways.

Friction is inevitable when players are encouraged to abide by a "you win, I lose" mentality. Reward silo decision-making and don't be surprised that people behave accordingly.

If the "me generation" characterizes your place of work, look out. Risk management is going to be a tough challenge. Effective enterprise wealth creation requires fluid communication and seamless operations. One hand must know what the other is doing in order to properly identify how various determinants of economic value either offset (hedge) or accelerate loss (leverage, correlation, lack of diversification).

Given its historic, just announced, write-down of $16+ billion, Merrill Lynch is taking the cow tale to heart. When asked by the Wall Street Journal to address "what shocked" the new CEO the most when he took the reins, John Thain replied - "Two things. One was the lack of understanding of the risk in these positions, and the lack of balance-sheet control. The balance sheet really got out of control, and traders were able to put on positions that were way too big, and I don't (think) there was a good understanding of what the risk was." He also added that "Merrill had a risk committee" but that "It just didn't function." (See "Merrill's Risk Manager" by Susane Craig and Randall Smith, January 18, 2008.)

Thain's response? Don't kill the cow. Encourage people to work together. In the same interview, Thain describes a newly mandated weekly meeting with the respective heads of fixed income, equity and risk. The goal is to avoid undue risk-taking that could bring down the house, not just for one group but for everyone - employees, shareholders and so on.

Pension fund managers can learn a few things from the Parable of the Bovine and Merrill's painful progress in managing large losses.

  • Acknowledge the value of working across divisions and job functions. Don't make investment or plan design decisions in a vacuum.
  • Don't empower one or more players to "run away" on their own. Internal controls are imperative. That includes a proper assessment of how external asset managers, custodians, consultants and the like manage their own financial process. If they are exposed to potential trouble spots, so are you.
  • Understand that a buy-in of good risk management practices by you and your peers raises the bar for everyone. Good team players should be rewarded by how the organization fares, not a particular division.

The Cow Theory may not push the Dow Theory off the investment map but it should be heeded nevertheless.

Risk Management Lapses Cost Money

It's always hard to get back to work after a few days off. It's especially difficult when economic uncertainty is casting a cloud of gloom over financial markets. As a result, investment risk continues to rank high as a "must do," making lapses seem even more questionable.

Our December 29, 2007 post talked about a risk management post-audit at Morgan Stanley ("Lonely CROs - Why Pensions Should Care"). A few weeks ago, Financial Times reporters Chris Hughes and Haig Simonian wrote about UBS woes, with the chairman admitting that the "Swiss bank's risk and finance unit had failed to understand the sub-prime mortgage positions that led to its $10bn writedown, even though it was aware of the massive figures involved."

In "CIBC plummets after 'underestimating' subprime risk," Financial Post reporter Duncan Mavin (December 6, 2007) cites multi-billion dollar losses due to sub-prime assets and a "hedged subprime exposure" of nearly US$10 billion, "including US$3.5-billion in a CDO with a counterparty that is single-A-rated and ratings-watch-negative." Peter Routledge, senior credit officer with Moody's, is quoted as saying that "The existence of concentrated risks in [CIBC's derivatives] portfolio points to weaknesses in strategic risk decision-making at the bank and indicate that improvements in the bank's risk management discipline have not permeated the organization as fully as Moody's had expected." A read of the CIBC Risk Management Committee Mandate suggests a focus, however incomplete, on process. In fact, a prominent risk expert sits on that committee, prompting Globe and Mail's Fabrice Taylor to write "The multibillion-dollar question: Who's minding the shop at CIBC?" (December 21, 2007). 

From the outside looking in, one can only surmise what might have happened. Lessons learned, as details are made public, will be invaluable to 401(k) and defined benefit plan fiduciaries who rely on banks all the time and for many reasons.

Lonely CROs - Why Pensions Should Care

In "Morgan Stanley reviews position of risk officer over writedowns" (December 22, 2007), Financial Times reporter Henny Sender describes the hostile environment in which some risk management gurus live. Declaring that critics now accuse the Morgan Stanley Chief Risk Officer of being late in "sounding the alarm about the dangers stemming from the bank's exposure to sub-prime related trades" or having used "language that was too technical or obscure," advocates counter that his warnings were ignored. Not surprisingly, other banks are "overhauling their risk management function after announcing multi-billion dollar losses on subprime-related trades. (Morgan Stanley reported an approximate $10 billion loss.) 

The article adds that Morgan Stanley's risk guru "was very vocal in saying that there were no proper pricing models for such trades, that positions were not being properly measured, and that the history traders used in their models was not a reliable guide." A further investigation will ultimately shed light on whether Mr. Risk at Morgan Stanley had the authority to effect significant change or was instead unaware of mounting exposures until it was too late.

The lessons to be learned here are far from trivial. Spending significant money to hire a risk wizard or team of pundits is a waste unless (a) the risk control function is recognized as essential to core operating activity and (b) these individuals are empowered to work independently of line managers. A new study suggests that the tide is turning though there is room for improvement.

According to "Beyond Compliance: The Maturation of CROs and Other Senior Executives" (GARP Risk Review, November/December 2007), researchers Annette Mikes and David Townsend describe the way Chief Risk Officers are encouraged to participate in "capital allocation and group-level budgeting and planning." At the same time, more than two-thirds of surveyed bank CROs expressed frustration at not being able to convince top management to improve risk disclosures included in public financial statements. Over reliance on risk models was cited as a concern of CROs, especially when credit allocation decisions are based on "automated model responses, with little oversight from humans." The article concludes that "the ultimate test remains the ability of risk managers to influence risk-taking behavior in the business lines."

As this blog's author wrote several years ago, Chief Risk Officers are part diplomat and part rocket scientist. Ultimately, their contributions are constrained by whether a risk culture exists within an organization. One can be technically competent but lack the organizational wherewithal to put out a fire. Read "Life in Financial Risk Management: Shrinking Violets Need Not Apply" by Dr. Susan Mangiero, Accredited Valuation Analyst, CFA and certified Financial Risk Manager.

Should pension and 401(k) plan sponsors care about bank risk management? Absolutely.

Since many retirement plans hire banks to manage assets or recommend bank funds to defined contribution plan participants, fiduciaries MUST include risk controls as part of their due diligence process when selecting, monitoring and perhaps firing money managers.

Some plan sponsors create and implement risk management policies that are separate from their formal Investment Policy Statement. Elsewhere, ERISA and public plans are hiring risk management professionals to go in-house. For example, the Ohio Public Employee Retirement System (OPERS) seeks a risk analyst who can perform tasks such as those shown below.

<< 1. Develops a comprehensive risk management program to identify, assess, manage and report investment related risks.

2. Oversees in coordination with the appropriate parties, the management of market, credit/counterparty, operations, reputation and other investment related risks.

3. Develops and participates in processes and procedures of reviewing, discussing and prioritizing risks in each major category.

4. Develops and reports risk metrics to monitor market, credit/counterparty, operations and other related risks.

5. Prepares periodic reports for senior management and OPERS Board to review investment related risks and makes recommendations, as appropriate.

6. Assesses risk management tools and capabilities, recommends improvements and implements approved solutions.

7. Reviews, monitors and oversees derivatives activities and capabilities for internal operations and for external managers in coordination with appropriate staff.

8. Performs on-site manager due diligence reviews from a risk assessment, management and monitoring perspective.

9. Leads and/or participates in various risk management committees.

10. Establishes and maintains a customer service focus work policy through example and clear, timely delineation of expectations. >>

Missing Collateral = More Risk for Hedge Funds and Pension Plans

Some investors may be getting coal for Christmas. According to a December 20, 2007 Financial Times article ("Hedge funds assess exposure to banks"), reporter Saskia Scholtes describes a role reversal with respect to risk. Whereas banks worried about hedge fund losses in the aftermath of the 1998 collapse of Long Term Capital Management, hedge funds now tally their exposure to credit-challenged banks. Noteworthy is an observation by attorney Lauren Tiegland-Hunt that one-way derivatives-related collateral agreements expose hedge funds to risk of bank failure. She adds that, even if an agreement was bilateral, banks sometimes amended terms to "prevent hedge funds from calling for collateral before a bank’s losses on the trade reached a certain threshold, with the bank’s threshold marked as 'infinity'."

Kudos to this managing  partner of law firm Tiegland-Hunt for calling attention to an important risk factor. As this blog has pointed out several times, the posting of fungible assets such as U.S. treasury bills is one way to mitigate counterparty risk. A thorough assessment of the credit worthiness of the counterparty, consideration of the expected risk associated with a particular derivative instrument and/or strategy and analysis of overall exposure to a given name are similarly important.

For those pension funds sending money to hedge fund land, make collateral assessment part of your due diligence. Derivative instruments, used properly, can sometimes offer a bevy of advantages over investing in the underlying "cash" asset. However, as Nobel prize-winning economist Milton Friedman oft-declared, "there is no free lunch." Once a derivative instrument is created, its fair value (zero at inception) changes. Unfortunately, gains can only be realized by the winner in this zero sum game if the loser does not default.

Editor's Note: To learn more about collateral issues as relates to derivative trading, check out the 2005 ISDA Collateral Guidelines. (ISDA stands for International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.)

Sub-Prime Losses Keep Coming

At this rate, one could spend hours blogging about sub-prime woes, risk and whether adequate controls were in place. In a December 4, 2007 Washington Post article entitled "Losses Stack Up: Local Officials in Florida Try to Assess Damage To Investments Linked to Soured Subprime Loans " by Tomoeh Murakami Tse, I was interviewed about pension risk management implications. (Click here to access the article. You may be asked to register.) The State Board of Administration of Florida itself acknowledges the importance of risk controls, both in a November 2007 account of their sub-prime losses and in later interviews about fund withdrawals, subsequent freezes prohibiting further withdrawals and the hiring of Blackrock to develop a financial game plan.

In a recent study by the Towers Group, risk management was found to be lacking at some organizations, arguably one cause for large losses. Describing the adverse consequences of siloed risk management functions in financial institutions, authors of "Multifunctional Integration: The Positive Side of Risk," cite the need to work across divisions. They add that  "Beyond defending against threats to the organization, a more integrated approach to risk management can drive other business and client-centric benefits, including: improved quality and transparency of information; relationship pricing; process simplicity and efficiency; more effective decision making; and overall resilience."

No surprise to this risk manager and blogger who has spent over 20 years in the areas of risk management consulting, forensic analysis, board and trustee training and process assessment. In trying to convey the importance of acting before the fact, our Pension Governance team oft-repeats the importance of a holistic investment risk orientation, commencing with comprehensive training for everyone - front, middle and back office staff included. Importantly, buy-in from the top drives the acceptance of an organizational-wide risk culture and allows for resources to purchase analytical systems, hire professionals and make sure everyone has a good understanding of checks and balances. (In a recent workshop I led on risk management, I encouraged pension fund professionals to spend time with the chief risk officers employed by their banks, mutual fund and hedge fund managers.) 

Whether separate risk management activity reflects a "penny wise, pound foolish" behavior depends on a host of factors and will vary across organizations. However, delay in implementing an effective process can be costly as pointed out in a December 2007 assessment of sub-prime litigation risk by Guy Carpenter & Company, LLC. In "What’s the State of Your State? E&O Risk Uneven across the Country," authors list six factors that give rise to litigation risk for real estate professionals (though noteworthy for other related parties, given the flurry of lawsuits now being filed). See below for excerpted text:

  • Percentage of mortgages in foreclosure
  • Percentage of subprime mortgages that are delinquent
  • Number of litigation attorneys per mortgage industry professional
  • Frequency of Truth in Lending lawsuits (per million households) through Q32006
  • Frequency of banking-related lawsuits (per million households) through Q32006
  • Extent to which a state is plaintiff-friendly, i.e., is deemed a “Judicial Hellhole” by the
    American Tort Reform Association (ATRA).

Mortgage bankers and real estate brokers may be getting pink slips but litigators are busier than ever. For retirement plan fiduciaries, it bears repeating. Ask external money managers if they have sub-prime problems, query about how they are addressing risk gaps and demand to know what lessons they have learned from the credit crisis.

Pension Fund Grinch - Rate Cuts and Investment Complexity

Disappointing many, the Federal Reserve cut rates by a smaller amount than expected. Equity investors responded with a resounding hiss, sending the Dow Jones Industrial Average down nearly 300 points. Defined benefit plan managers can't be too happy either. After all, many of them have more money allocated to stocks than bonds. Then there is the matter of reported net unfunded liabilities rising as rates fall. What's an asset allocator to do?

This blog's author recently read survey results that suggest a significant migration to more complex securities. Not surprisingly, researchers describe a struggle on the part of investors and financial advisors who need higher returns but are not always comfortable that they understand the risks. (See "Financial Advisors to Embrace More Sophisticated Investment Products Over the Next Two Years, According to New Data from Cogent Research," Insurance Newscast, December 7, 2007.) 

I hate to say it folks but here goes. Why invest in something you don't understand? Isn't that part of the reason why the sub-prime debacle is starting to make the S&L crisis look like a walk in the park? Several incidents come to mind.

Following the 1987 market crash, equity put option writers sued their brokers, saying they did not understand the nearly unbounded downside, forcing some into bankruptcy. In the early 1980's, a handful of prominent institutional investors sued their bankers for putting them into complex, new fangled derivatives. One treasurer acknowledged the need to know more, exclaiming "Due to my inexperience, I placed a great deal of reliance on the advice of market professionals….. I wish I had more training in complex government securities."

Mark my words. The courts will be hearing a lot of cases that address who ultimately has responsibility for investment strategies gone awry. Pre-exemptively, pension funds must seek legal counsel to review their fiduciary duties. Nevertheless, as strategies become more complex, there will be sufficient numbers of investors who simply do not understand the risk and, absent good process, will lose money.

This gets back to a point made many times herein. Shouldn't pension decision makers (regardless of plan design) be required and/or encouraged to have a particular familiarity (experience, education) with investment and risk management?

The fact that no such certification requirement exists amazes and disturbs. 

Bank Risk Managers - Missing in Action?

In a recent interview on the John Batchelor show, Globalprivatequity.com, Inc. CEO Doug Miles described the current credit crisis as a "black swan" event. This summer, Miles predicted the valuation fallout associated with complex derivative instruments. Adding that banks can't know the extent of their problems anytime soon, an uncertain interest rate environment, new valuation accounting rules such as FAS 157 and infrequent trading in instruments such as Collateralized Debt Obligations make life very uncomfortable. Click here to listen to the November 11, 2007 interview with John Batchelor and Doug Miles.

In his bestselling book, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, essayist Nassim Nicholas Taleb assigns three attributes to a black swan event in business. "First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable." Click here to read the first chapter, as reprinted by the New York Times on April 22, 2007. In his video interview entitled "Learning to Expect the Unexpected," Taleb describes the human brain as "designed to retain, for efficient storage, past information that fits into a compressed narrative." He adds that "this distortion, called the hindsight bias" makes it difficult to learn from past mistakes.

If true that the sub-prime situation is a black swan as Miles asserts, and taking a page from Taleb, we embrace the notion that we are blind to randomness, what then is the proper role of risk management? According to Financial Week reporter Matthew Quinn, inquiring minds are asking "Where were the risk managers?" He avers that some pundits debate whether technology can keep up with product innovation or adequately assess leverage. He suggests that, even if rocket scientists raise their hand, warnings may go unheeded, especially given banks' dependence on proprietary trading. See "Risk managers return (belatedly) to Street: Chastened banks, brokerages get religion on minimizing exposure to hidden bombs. Coulda, woulda, shoulda?" (Financial Week, November 19, 2007). 

In an article I wrote in mid 2003, I commented that the life of a risk manager is challenging to say the least. In addition to a plethora of data analysis skills, a Chief Risk Officer ("CRO") or someone with similar functional duties must be a diplomat, a motivator and a keen student of human behavior. Most people don't want to hear bad news since it usually means more work for them, not to mention the added stress and the potential damage to one's career of being tainted with a problem. Read "Life in Financial Risk Management: Shrinking Violets Need Not Apply" (AFP Exchange, July/August 2003).

Unfortunately, for retirement plan decision-makers, risk management is going to be impossible to ignore. Pension funds that include allocations to bank stocks or equity in bank-like financial organizations are already feeling the pinch. Plan sponsors who hired bank asset managers or hedge funds/mutual funds that invested in banks are going to be asked tough questions about the due diligence they performed. Did they sufficiently kick the tires with respect to understanding how the banks managed risk? Fiduciaries of banks' 401(k) plans who recommended company stock are getting sued for allegedly having done too little to assess the attendant risks. Just last week, a complaint was filed against the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), citing poor controls that encouraged the acceptance of "risky" loans and inappropriate appraisals of those loans. Click here to read the class action complaint against Freddie Mac.

Black swan or not, the current credit crisis is going to get nastier. Expect many more litigation complaints in the ensuing months.

Pension Fiduciaries - Have You Asked Your Bankers About Their Risk Controls?

In a November 5, 2007 statement, Citi announced that current CEO Charles Prince will step down. Robert E. Rubin will become Chairman of the Board and a search for a new leader will begin immediately. In a related story, Wall Street Journal reporters Carrick Mollenkamp and David Reilly describe Citigroup's struggles to estimate trading losses, in large part due to the fact that internal quantitative models relied heavily on credit ratings assigned to securities that were used in structuring Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). With recent downgrades (to arguably better reflect risk levels), the value of Citi's sub-prime holdings similarly sank. Credit fears dampened already limited trading interest, forcing a heavy reliance on a mark-to-model approach.

As this blog's author has stated many times before, model risk is real. Bad or inappropriately used models lead to imprecise outputs. Decisions based on poor information can only lead to trouble. According to "Why Citi Struggles to Tally Losses Swelling Write-Downs Show Just How Fallible Pricing Models Can Be" (Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2007), modelers projected future expected payments for then high-rated sub-prime backed CDOs on the basis of how similar credit rated corporate bonds were trading. By not recognizing that default experience for corporate versus sub-primed backed securities differed dramatically, Citi's rocket scientists painted too rosy a valuation picture.

In a related article ("Where Did the Buck Stop at Merrill? November 4, 2007), New York Times reporters Graham Bowley and Jenny Anderson describe oversight problems at Merrill Lynch. Following a $8.4 billion charge and the recent resignation of CEO O'Neal, questions have arisen about whether board members should be more aware of daily operations, especially those areas that are likely to present problems if things go awry. Quoting Meredith Whitney, CIBC World Markets financial analyst, the point is made that Merrill had no one with sub-prime experience to serve on any of the committees charged with risk oversight and auditing. Despite creating a post for Chief Risk Officer in early September 2007, other experts cited in the article decry the lack of board/oversight committee independence from senior management, at the same time that large trading books were "hard to value."

By extension, this notion of oversight applies to pension fiduciaries. As this blog's author has repeatedly emphasized, plan sponsors MUST do a thorough job of vetting service providers (including banks) with respect to their "red flag" controls. How many pension fiduciaries ask about the existence of a Chief Risk Officer (or lack thereof)? How much detail do pension fiduciaries demand to know about each bank's risk management function, certainly for key parts of trading operations? Do pension fiduciaries ask to speak to members of the valuation team and/or those responsible for collateral management? Have pension fiduciaries asked banks about their progress with respect to preparing for Basel II and related model requirements? (Click here to read the November 2, 2007 press release from the Federal Reserve Board which describes their approval of new risk-based capital rules.) The list of other "must know" queries is long but nevertheless essential to proper due diligence.

Will clever attorneys make a case for poor process if pension fiduciaries have allocated monies to any or all of the banks now making headlines, citing breach if they failed to dig deep about risk and valuation policies and procedures?

Pension Buyouts - Banks Are Gearing Up

In discussing his relationship with service providers, a plan sponsor recently told me that he feels like a juicy steak to a hungry lion. Everyone wants his business and he struggles to keep up with the many requests for meetings with consultants, actuaries and asset managers. According to "Pensions may be outsourced : Banks look to take the plans and their assets off the hands of employers" (October 31, 2007), that fiduciary may be even busier now, fending off requests to assume his company's defined benefit plan(s).  As Los Angeles Times reporter Jonathan Peterson describes, Citigroup has just received an okay from the Federal Reserve to "take over" a $400 million retirement plan, sponsored by Thomson Regional Newspapers.

If a harbinger of things to come (and banks are definitely gearing up for this business), risk management acumen and internal controls should be front and center. After all, if a liability is transferred from the original plan sponsor to a large bank, it will be discomfort indeed if that bank struggles with keeping its own house in order. The stakes are too high. Lest you think that big always means better, keep in mind that we've just gone through a rollercoaster summer with a handful of financial giants reporting losses.

As regulators examine the efficacy of pension buyouts by banks in the U.S. and elsewhere, this blog's author recommends that a bank's pension-related risk control abilities be made publicly available for analysis and review. The last thing we need is a concentration of pension assets in a few shaky hands. Better that everyone is comfortable upfront with the buyers' abilities in the areas of risk management, operational processing and good pension governance.

 

Private Pools of Capital - Pensions Help to Craft Policy

According to a September 25, 2007 press release for the President's Working Group on Financial Markets ("PWG"), pension funds are playing an active role in setting policy. Following on the heels of guidelines released in February 2007, one committee, headed by Eric Mindich, CEO of Eton Park Capital Management, seeks to provide the asset management perspective. A second committee, led by Russell Read, Chief Investment Officer of the California Public Employees Retirement System, will represent institutional investors such as pensions, endowments and foundations. Click here to read yesterday's press release.

Drawing on the "Agreement Among PWG and U.S. Agency Principals on Principles and Guidelines Regarding Private Pools of Capital," drafted earlier this year, committee members will consider fiduciary duties. Not surprisingly, decision-makers are asked to consider the adequacy of disclosure, risk and valuation policies. Excerpted text follows.

  • 5.1 Fiduciaries should consider the suitability of an investment in a private pool within the context of the overall portfolio and in light of the investment objectives and risk tolerances. Fiduciary evaluation should include the investment objectives, strategies, risks, fees, liquidity, performance history, and other relevant characteristics of a private pool.
  • 5.2 Fiduciaries should evaluate the pool’s manager and personnel, including background, experience, and disciplinary history. Fiduciaries also should assess the pool’s service providers and evaluate their independence from the pool’s managers. Fiduciaries should consider the private pool’s manager’s conflicts-of-interest and whether the manager has appropriate controls in place to manage those conflicts.
  • 5.3 Fiduciaries should conduct the appropriate due diligence regarding valuation methodology and performance calculation processes and business and operational risk management systems employed by a private pool, including the extent of independent audit evaluation of such processes and systems.
  • 5.4 Fiduciaries that determine to invest in a private pool of capital should ensure that the size of their investment is consistent with their investment objectives and the principle of portfolio diversification.

The guidelines merit more than a cursory review. One sentence in particular struck a chord. Citing the importance of news, institutional investors are urged to obtain and analyze data that is both frequent and "with sufficient detail that creditors, counterparties, and investors stay informed of strategies, the amount of risk being taken by the pool, and any material changes." As readers of this blog know, seeing is believing. More than a few asset managers may be unwilling to unlock the keys to the information gateway, citing economic hardship if forced to provide full disclosure. Just a few days ago, the SEC announced penalties for an asset manager who failed to file Form 13F, evidencing their exercise of "investment discretion over $100 million or more." (Note: There is no universal agreement that 13F filings permit "sufficient" information transparency. At least one court case asks whether an asset manager should be forced to file without recompense for the "taking" of added-value that results from "superior" analysis.)

Additionally, access to greater amounts of information does not necessarily beget better information. Even if available data is Goldilocks perfect ("just right"), what happens when pension investors are unable to process what has been received?

It will be informative to see what the two committees create in terms of operationalizing these fine, but arguably broad, guidelines.

Liquidity Crunch, Bonds and Pension Plans

Have the last few months of negative headlines scared you yet? If not, don't be too complacent. According to a recent survey conducted by Greenwich Associates, institutional investors have grown weary of structured financial products and fixed income securities. According to a summary provided by CFO.com writer Stephen Taub, a worldwide credit crisis "has caused a nearly complete disruption in the trading and use of many fixed-income products." Even trading in ordinarily liquid corporate bond markets has reportedly been difficult, leaving many scratching their heads as to whether the credit crisis is a short-term blip or a long-lived problem. Taub adds that the survey predates the Fed's recent rate cut. (Click here to read "Liquidity Crunch: How Long Will it Last?")

In his September 20, 2007 testimony before the House Committe on Financial Services, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson describes the "interconnectedness" of global capital markets and the fallout from concerns over sub-prime mortgages - reduced investor confidence, reassessment of risk, and temporary diminuition of liquidity. Describing self-correction tendencies of financial markets, Paulson's more sanguine take can be accessed by clicking here.

After a recent bridge game, I had a chance to ask my friend, Dr. Lucjan Orlowski, for his view of the world around us. As Senior Fellow at the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) at the University of Bonn; a Senior Fellow at the Center for Economic and Social Research (CASE) in Warsaw; a Research Fellow at the William Davidson Institute (WDI) at the University of Michigan School of Business, and a Research Professor at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin, Orlowski's opinion counts in more ways than one. His prognosis? Not very good - In fact, he was downright gloomy with respect to jobs growth and continued ill-effects of this summer's incorrect pricing of default risk. Click here to read Lucjan's impressive bio.

So what does all of this mean for pension funds? Let us count the ways.

1. Diminished liquidity could imperil a plan's ability to meet its short-term obligations. This is especially serious for mature plans or in situations where labor contracts offer few opportunties to revise cash outflows. How should strategic asset allocations change to reflect a sustained credit crunch (if you accept that premise)?

2. Fewer companies are making their way to capital markets. Will a reduction in fixed income security issuance and/or a widening bid-ask spread make it more difficult for pensions to execute any type of liability-driven investing tactic that involves bonds or bond derivatives?

3. Will a weakening U.S. dollar, likely to experience even more downward pressure as oil producers switch to Euro invoicing, compel plans to seek out international assets? Will plan sponsors need to ask external asset managers more questions about risk controls, notably currency hedging techniques, as a result?

4. Could lower U.S. interest rates push some plans over the edge in terms of funding status and inevitable financial consequences?

5. Will changing correlation patterns, and the related reduction of diversification potential, leave defined benefit plan sponsors in a position of having to take on more risk? In the event that FASB requires additional pension investment risk disclosure, will corporate plan sponsors begin to feel pressure from shareholders as market volatility is more explicitly embedded in financial statements?

These are but a few possibilities for those who see the glass half empty and draining fast.

Is Disclosure Really That Hard?


Investment risk disclosure continues to take center stage. In "Clearing the Financial Fog - Emily Barrett ponders the virtues of transparency" (Wall Street Journal, MarketBeat Blog, September 14, 2007, posted by Tim Annett), the point is made that full disclosure is fraught with problems.

"The trouble with transparency is, there’s just something terribly obscure about it."

"In some ways, banks are already engaged in the clarification process, as more are forced to take back on their books funds previously buried out of regulators’ reach. This includes loans lying around in banks’ warehouses waiting to be chopped up and sold to raise money for private-equity takeovers. A number of bank sponsors of hedge funds have also been forced either to cut credit lines, or, as in the case of Bear Stearns Asset Management, to commit financing to shore them up. But there are limits to how clear banks can be. The complexity of structured finance, which deals in layered bundles of debt, doesn’t lend itself to easy analysis."

“The problem is exposures get buried in different structures,” said Jim Caron, rates strategist at Morgan Stanley. “I don’t think it’s a lack of willingness to get things out to regulators, there’s just a natural lack of transparency in these structures.”

Click here to read the aforementioned post in full.

To be sure, dec