Pension Risk News & Analysis : Pension Governance, LLC : Pension Risk & Investment

In case you missed it, possible trend-setting legal parries are commanding attention from New York jurists, institutional investors and proxy specialists. According to corporate governance expert Jay Brown, "The CSX case is the first decision to find that shareholders must sometimes disclose the shares acquired by investors as part of equity swap transactions. This holding makes it harder for activist shareholders - trying to acquire or influence control of a public company - to keep their holdings secret." Brown should know. As a securities law professor (University of Denver Sturm College of Law) and lead contributor to The Race to the Bottom (a widely read legal blog), he and colleagues have penned no fewer than 16 posts about the ongoing litigation between CSX Corporation ("CSX") and several CSX investors - 3G Capital Partners ("3G" or "3G Capital") and The Children's Investment Master Fund ("TCI").

By way of background (and this is a summary only), a letter was sent to CSX by TCI on February 7, 2008, stating its intentions to acquire effective control. In response, CSX filed a lawsuit against the two funds. The Q1-2008 quarterly SEC filing for CSX states:

<< On March 17, 2008, the Company filed a lawsuit against The Children’s Investment Master Fund (together with certain of its affiliates, “TCI”), 3G Capital Partners Ltd. (together with certain of its affiliates, “3G”) and certain of their affiliates (collectively, the “TCI Group”) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging violations of federal securities laws, including violations of Sections 13(d) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The lawsuit alleges, among other things, that TCI and 3G have undisclosed plans with respect of CSX. The lawsuit further alleges that TCI and 3G have employed swap agreements in order to evade the filing requirements of Section 13(d) and that their Section 14(a) and Section 13(d) filings concerning their collective 12.3 percent swap position in CSX shares are materially misleading. The lawsuit further alleges that TCI’s and 3G’s disclosures in their Section 14(a) and Section 13(d) filings concerning their formation of a Section 13(d) group are false and misleading. >>

Click to access the CSX 10-Q, filed on 4/16/08. Click to read the complaint for "CSX Corporation v. The Children's Investment Management (UK) LLP et al," filed with the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York.

Following various motions (in limine, opposition and so on), the two funds (owning about 20 percent in direct form and via equity derivative contracts) sent a letter to other CSX shareholders on June 20, 2008 in which they explain why five nominees should be elected to the CSX board. Citing support for their slate from RiskMetrics Group - ISS Governance Services, they write:

<< If you believe CSX cannot afford to rest on its laurels in favorable pricing and market environments, if you believe that CSX should strive to achieve its full operating potential, if you believe that CSX can and should be the best railroad in America and, finally, if you believe the board of CSX will benefit from the railroad experience of our nominees, along with the perspectives of large shareholders who are engaged because they have made a significant investment in CSX stock using their own money, we urge you to join with us in electing our five nominees to the board of directors of CSX by voting on the BLUE TCI/3G proxy card today. >>

On June 20, 2008, Judges Hall, Livingston and McMahon opine that TCI and 3G Capital Partners can vote their shares, additionally setting up a briefing schedule to include a July 25, 2008 date by which reply briefs in each appeal must be filed. Click to read the ruling.

The "TCI and 3G Comment on Circuit Court Ruling" (dated June 20, 2008) is short and sweet, expressing confidence in the then future June 25, 2008 vote to elect "five highly qualified director nominees." Following that vote, CSX declares the June 25, 2008 board vote "too close to call." In its June 25, 2008 press release, CSX states that the "annual meeting will reconvene at 10 am ET on Friday, July 25, 2008.

Courtesy of Knowledge Mosaic, we know that many large pension funds likewise invest in CSX (at least as of the end of Q1-2008). Regardless of the election results, the corporate governance impact is real. A partial list of funds is included below.

• CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM
• CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM
• CANADA PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT BOARD
• ELCA BOARD OF PENSIONS
• EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF TEXAS
• IBM RETIREMENT FUND
• NEW MEXICO EDUCATIONAL RETIREMENT BOARD
• NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND
• NEW YORK STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM
• ONTARIO TEACHERS PENSION PLAN BOARD
• PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION OF COLORADO
• PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF OHIO
• PUBLIC SECTOR PENSION INVESTMENT BOARD
• STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION OF FLORIDA RETIREMENT SYSTEM
• TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF TEXAS
• VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEMS ET AL

Not being an attorney, this case caught my eye because of the numerous and complex investment and governance implications, including the concept of"beneficial ownership" and use of financial derivative instruments. Several things come to mind.

• When a defined benefit invests in a particular stock (or selects such stock for its defined contribution plan participants), are plan fiduciaries doing sufficient homework with respect to identifying "large" ownership stakes and assessing possible corporate governance implications?
• For those defined benefit plans allocating monies to activist hedge funds, are investment fiduciaries taking into account a potential diversification "offset" that could occur if the plan invests directly in the same stock that represents a concentrated hedge fund position? (This is predicated on the notion that many pensions invest in alternatives for portfolio diversification reasons.)
• Are pensions (endowments and foundations too) asking enough questions about their external money managers' use of derivatives? Always a critical exercise, this case illustrates that equity exposure can be material through both direct buys and indirect trades, i.e. equity swaps. Though not germane to this case, equity futures or options facilitate exposure to an individual stock and/or a particular sector of the equity markets. Will their use connote "beneficial ownership" and is the exposure deemed significant? (Note that in their June 2, 2008 amici curiae brief, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association argue against the notion that equity swaps evidence "beneficial ownership," adding that to conclude otherwise would disrupt derivative market activity.  In an unrelated case, "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Larry P. Langford et al" (filed with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division, on April 30, 2008), the issue as to whether swaps (interest rate) are securities appears again. See "SEC Plan for Swaps 'Securities' Gets Alabama Rebuff" by Bloomberg reporter Joe Mysak (July 3, 2008).
• In the event that a fund manager is known to use equity derivatives (because the pension fund or consultant inquires), should plan fiduciaries be carefully tracking whether the derivatives represent a hedge, a cross-hedge or an anticipatory price/volatility trade? In the case of a hedge, yet another question goes to how best to measure effectiveness.

The CSX case is sure to be the beginning of a lively debate among financial market participants and corporate issuers.

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Besides the fact that Liability-Driven Investing ("LDI") takes multiple forms (each of which should be fully evaluated in a risk-return context), there is no universal consent about relevant action steps. As described in "Why LDI is Stuck in Neutral" by Dr. Susan Mangiero, a "roll your shirtsleeves up" approach to gathering and assimilating information makes sense.

The full text of the June 12, 2008 MoneyVoices column, published by Fundfire.com/Money-Media, a Financial Times Company, is presented below, with permission.

                                                                               * * * * * *

Why LDI is Stuck in Neutral

Guest Columnist: Susan Mangiero is president and CEO of Pension Governance, an independent research and analysis company.

Despite the hoopla, pension fund fiduciaries have yet to recognize liability-driven investing (“LDI”) as the ultimate in asset-liability management. No doubt a disappointment to the banking set, there are some legitimate reasons for its slow adoption. For starters, there is no consensus on what the term truly means, tempting one to use “loosely defined investing” as a more apt moniker.

Questions abound. When are derivatives used in lieu of cash assets only? Is a portable alpha engine an integral part of an LDI focus, or is it optional? Can LDI results be meaningfully benchmarked across plans? How does the use of LDI impact the determination of an optimal asset allocation mix? What must fiduciaries consider when assessing whether LDI-related fees are “reasonable?”

Even if everyone agrees on what LDI means, there is never a free lunch. What a plan gains in terms of risk mitigation, it will lose by assuming incremental risk. For example, using an interest rate swap introduces new uncertainties tied to counterparty default, settlement, legal standing and/or operations. A retirement plan that shifts money out of equity into typically lower yielding fixed income securities confronts opportunity cost. Add-ons in the form of alternative investments potentially juice up returns, but could wreak havoc with an existing risk budget. LDI makes sense when expected benefits exceed likely costs (direct and indirect).

Fiduciary literacy is yet another factor. Just as folks begin to ease into “new fangled” offerings, LDI forces decision-makers to take a sophisticated look at the economic funding gap. Understanding the dynamic behavior of asset and liability risk drivers is tough enough. Add a derivative instrument or hedge fund overlay and some decision-makers may dismiss LDI as complex and therefore “too risky.” More education is needed.

Deciding on the appropriateness of liability-driven investing is like anything else. Context and good process count for a lot. In some circumstances, an LDI strategy (however defined) may be a no-brainer. In other situations, its adoption could exacerbate existing problems. Regardless of outcome (“to LDI or not”), pension fiduciaries cannot escape their duty to ask questions, examine its likely risk-return impact (now and under various market scenarios) and oversee external managers’ risk controls (either as counterparties or potential alpha generators).

Disclaimer: The information provided by this article should not be construed as financial or legal advice. The reader should consult with his or her own advisors.

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According to Wall Street Journal reporter Carrick Mollenkamp ("Libor Surges After Scrutiny Does, Too - April 18, 2008), the British Bankers' Association is moving ahead to investigate the veracity of self-reported cost-of-funds numbers. The fear is that banks are paying more to borrow in the short run than they want to admit. If peers discover the truth, bank borrowers may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage. Non-borrowers will feel the pinch too as will swap and over-the-counter fixed income option counterparties and those trading the Eurodollar futures contract. The London Interbank Offer Rate ("LIBOR") is a common base rate for most short-term loans and derivative instrument contracts.

American regulators are worried too as market pundits predict that U.S. dollar LIBOR rates are likely to spiral. Just last week, three-month LIBOR loan rates rose to 2.8175% per annum, up from 2.7335%, "the biggest increase since the three-month rate rose 0.12 percentage point on August 9" when BNP Paribas prevented investors from withdrawing money from several of their funds. The current level is reported at "its highest" since March 13 when news came out about Bear Stearns.

A rising LIBOR makes swap-driven Liability-Driven Investing ("LDI") strategies more expensive for Fixed Rate Receivors - Floating Rate Payors. In addition, if quarterly checks indeed differ from estimated projections, pensions may eschew LDI strategies as too difficult to evaluate for accounting or risk management purposes.

Interestingly, quotation problems seem to be contained to U.S. dollar LIBOR situations and not other currencies such as the Euro.

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In an effort to unlock the mystery about pension investment risk-taking (something we've discussed at length in previous posts), the Financial Accounting Standards Board recently released FASB Staff Position FAS 132r-a (Employers' Disclosures about Postretirement Benefit Plan Assets) for public comment. This author is preparing a response on behalf of Pension Governance, LLC (having also been invited to informally speak with FASB last summer about risk metrics and disclosure pitfalls). If adopted, it will combine elements of FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, and FAS 133/161, the latter being focused on accounting for derivative instruments. 

Critics are already sharpening the proverbial knives, asserting that the proposed rule addresses the asset side only, leaving interested parties in the dark with respect to the economic impact of integrated asset-liability management strategies. Others suggest that a requirement for plan sponsors to separately disclose the fair value of each "significant" category of plan assets will be lots of work with limited benefit to financial statement users. Having worked with FAS 133 compliance (sometimes referred to as the "consultants' full employment act"), I believe that FAS 132r will encourage plan sponsors to hire outsiders to assist with fair valuation and valuation process checks. (We offer this service as do others.) For some plans, the cost of engaging an independent third party might be cost-prohibitive, putting fiduciaries in a difficult spot as to what to do instead, especially if staff members are ill-equipped to do the work on their own. On the positive side, a comprehensive review (if done properly) can aid plan sponsors by pointing out compliance and economic gaps.

Click to read the draft of the FASB proposed pension accounting rules. Public comments will be accepted until May 2, 2008.

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In what should be seen as a giant step forward for anyone interested in pension fund financial health, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) just approved a proposal that could force additional disclosures about investments. The rationale should be obvious. Defined benefit plans are allocating billions of dollars to alternative investments. When these capital pools invest in "hard to value" assets, trying to gauge pension risk is like catching jello. It's a near impossible task.

According to the Board Meeting Handout for February 13, 2008, few plan sponsors have gone beyond what is required of them by FAS 132(R), essentially reporting asset class categories "without further disaggregation." Additionally, the Board decided in November 2007 that FASB Statement No. 157 (fair value rule) would not apply to pension plans. In the absence of other mandates and voluntary disclosure (something free market economists favor, myself included), retirees and shareholders are nearly clueless when trying to gauge potential fallout from "risky" investing. If approved as an amendment of Statement 132(R), the new rule would "include a principle for disaggration of plan assets and a list of required asset categories" and "require further disclosure of categories or subcategories for concentratons of risk."

This blog's author has written ad nauseum about the critical information void with respect to pension investment risk. In fact, I literally just submitted a provocative piece on this topic for CFA Magazine. It will be part of the March/April 2008 issue.

Here are some initial thoughts. (I could write a book on this topic of pension risk disclosure.)

• Could disaggregation veil true risk exposure in much the same way that single asset performance is not the same as portfolio performance?
• Will there be a universal consensus about how to properly measure risk?
• Will certain risk metrics be accepted as superior for a particular asset class (an approach I advocate)?
• Will increased disclosures discourage some plan sponsors from dipping their toes into alternative investment waters?
• Will pensions be encouraged to hire Chief Risk Officers as pension risk management takes its rightful place on stage?
• Will some instruments such as derivatives be decomposed as standalone versus embedded?
• Will alternative managers push back from pension clients when asked to open their trading books to more scrutiny? (Remember the response when several endowments asked alternative fund managers for more information as part of the Freedom of Information Act a few years back? They were  shut out of deals.)

The U.S. Government Accountability Office is soon to release its study about pension fund investments in hedge funds. It will be interesting to compare their recommendations with those from the folks in Norwalk, home of FASB.

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February 11 was a bit of an equity rollercoaster. Reports of another big price gap were to blame. According to Reuters, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, external auditors for AIG, "concluded that the company had a material weakness in its internal control over financial reporting relating to the fair valuation of credit default swap portfolio obligations of AIG Financial Products Corp." Those in the know estimate the unrealized valuation loss relating to credit default swaps as being close to $5 billion, much bigger than originally believed. The stock closed down 12 percent lower. (Click to read "AIG discloses hole in derivatives valuation" by Lilla Zuill.)

Several questions come to mind, not the least of which is whether internal auditors came to the same conclusion at the same time and by the same route. How did the outside auditors decide on the adjustment? What models did they use? (AIG's Form 8-K, filed with the SEC as of February 11, 2008, mentions the Binomial Expansion Technique and Monte Carlo Simulation.) How often did auditors and traders kick the proverbial tires? On the business development front, how will this news impact organizations on the other side of AIG trades? Will they ask for more collateral? Will trade size fall to reflect a reappraisal of default risk?

To be sure, AIG is not the only name in the headlines. Irrespective of any particular company, and as we've mentioned many times before, pension funds are duly exposed when they transact derivatives, buy financial company stock or bonds or allocate money to multi-purpose behemoths. Now is not the time to be shy about asking tough questions as regards risk management and valuation policies and procedures of firms such as AIG. This holds true even when a consultant is engaged. Legal experts remind. Fiduciary oversight remains.

Awhile ago, this blogger authored "Asset Valuation: Not a Trivial Pursuit" for the Institute of Internal Auditors. Topics discussed include model risk, model validation and the internal auditor's role. Also check out "The Role of the Financial Expert in Valuation of Derivative Instruments." Yes Virginia, there is lots of litigation as a result of markdowns, disclosure questions and risk management process (or lack thereof). 

On March 5, 2008 (in case you missed our earlier announcement), Pension Governance, LLC is proud to sponsor a webinar entitled "Fiduciary Risk, Trading Controls and External Asset Manager Selection." Persons who attend this 75-minute webinar will learn the following:

• What Constitutes "Must Have" Elements of Effective Risk Management Systems
• Ways to Detect Deviation from Management Style and/or Excess Position Concentration
• Red Flags Regarding Possible Rogue Trading
• Industry Best Practices for Trading Controls and Lessons Learned About What to Avoid.

We hope to have you join us!

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Reporter Fabrice Taylor authors an interesting article in the January 30, 2007 issue of Globe and Mail. It's not  a paper I regularly read though I may start.  (This blog's author happens to be in Toronto right now as a speaker about U.S. pension litigation trends, part of the Canadian Institute's conference on Pension Law, Litigation and Governance).

Anyhow, I digress.

"The minefield of derivatives" points out a somewhat dramatic irony. How could a well-read UK risk publication have known that showcasing Societe Generale as the "Equity Derivatives House of the Year" in its January 2008 issue would later raise eyebrows? Taylor continues that derivatives are not inherently bad unless used by those "who don't understand them or have the wrong incentives." Touche!

He urges readers not to scare in the presence of the very large numbers that characterize the global derivatives market. I concur. As I discuss in Risk Management for Pensions, Endowments and Foundations, notional principal amount is often a far cry from the economic exposure at stake. Another point which resonates is his comment that "Most derivative explosions happen when a trader thinks he understands the co-relationships between a basket of related derivatives and learns, painfully, that his computer models were wrong." Indeed.

Model risk is a story in bad need of being told again and again. This blog's author has written a few articles on the subject. Drop a line if you'd like a copy. There is MUCH more to be said here, including what constitutes a good model and, by extension, when a model may be ill-suited or entirely inappropriate for a given situation.

Taylor concludes that greed drives many bad trades, frequently caught long after the damage has been done. Comparing last year's Wall Street bonuses of $33 billion to $100 billion of reported credit write-downs, he adds "Shareholders lost that money; rest assured the bonuses won't be repaid to them."

Interesting take from the land of the maple!

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As 2008 rolls in, uncertainty is on the minds of many. Will there be a recession? Will market volatility persist? Will asset prices continue to converge, making it more difficult to diversify? One question in particular is oft-discussed, notably the issue of strategic asset allocation for defined benefit plans. In a December 17, 2007 news release, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System Board of Administration announced its intent to invest nearly 70 percent of its $250 billion under management to stocks. Private equity will account for 10 percent, up from 6 percent. According to Charles P. Valdes, Investment Committee Chair, “These revised allocation markers reflect the promise of our private equity, real estate, and asset-linked investment classes."

In stark contrast, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation went in the opposite direction a few years ago, now bearing the burden of a positive equity risk premium. In a December 20, 2007 article entitled "The $4 billion trade-off: PBGC misses out by eschewing stocks in favor of LDI," Financial Week reporter Doug Halonen points out the perils of allocating a high percentage of assets to fixed income. He rightly points out "the irony" that numerous companies are seriously investigating the economics of adopting a liability-driven investing strategy which almost always entails a shift away from stocks to bonds and/or interest rate derivatives.

Importantly, the decision to invest in alternatives, including private equity, must reflect a careful analysis of the likely risk-return tradeoff, mapped to the objectives and constraints of a particular pension plan. A short-term focus could create upset for those exposed to holdings that more logically lend themselves to a long-term commitment. In today's "Wall St. Way: Smart People Seeking Dumb Money," New York Times reporter Eric Dash writes that investors in Ohio Public Employees Retirement System and Fidelity Investors "would have made more money this year investing in an old-fashioned index fund that tracks the S&P 500-stock index" rather than plunking down money for the IPO of "private equity powerhouse" Blackstone Group. Perhaps that's true but does it matter if their respective goals are to realize capital gain over the next five to seven years? (Note that this blog's author has no knowledge of the intent of either investor.)

Allowing for upside potential (and statistics do validate a big move into private equity by pensions, endowments and foundations), lack of liquidity and valuation difficulties are harsh realities. However, barriers are starting to soften. Barry Silbert, CEO of Restricted Stock Partners, operates the Restricted Securities Trading Network, a mechanism for trading insider stock options, convertible bonds and private investments in public equity. A recent venture capital injection is arguably a validation of this attempt to enhance fungibility of otherwise "infrequently traded" instruments. The PORTAL Alliance, brings together the Nasdaq Stock Market and leading securities firms to "create an open, industry-standard facility for the private offering, trading, shareholder tracking and settlement of unregistered equity securities sold to qualified institutional buyers ("QIBs")." If successful in allowing for ready buys and sells, institutions may be more open to kicking the private equity tires.

For further reading, these websites (a few of many) may be of interest:

• Private Equity Council
• Private Equity Industry Guidelines Group
• PrivateEquity.com.
  

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Some investors may be getting coal for Christmas. According to a December 20, 2007 Financial Times article ("Hedge funds assess exposure to banks"), reporter Saskia Scholtes describes a role reversal with respect to risk. Whereas banks worried about hedge fund losses in the aftermath of the 1998 collapse of Long Term Capital Management, hedge funds now tally their exposure to credit-challenged banks. Noteworthy is an observation by attorney Lauren Tiegland-Hunt that one-way derivatives-related collateral agreements expose hedge funds to risk of bank failure. She adds that, even if an agreement was bilateral, banks sometimes amended terms to "prevent hedge funds from calling for collateral before a bank’s losses on the trade reached a certain threshold, with the bank’s threshold marked as 'infinity'."

Kudos to this managing  partner of law firm Tiegland-Hunt for calling attention to an important risk factor. As this blog has pointed out several times, the posting of fungible assets such as U.S. treasury bills is one way to mitigate counterparty risk. A thorough assessment of the credit worthiness of the counterparty, consideration of the expected risk associated with a particular derivative instrument and/or strategy and analysis of overall exposure to a given name are similarly important.

For those pension funds sending money to hedge fund land, make collateral assessment part of your due diligence. Derivative instruments, used properly, can sometimes offer a bevy of advantages over investing in the underlying "cash" asset. However, as Nobel prize-winning economist Milton Friedman oft-declared, "there is no free lunch." Once a derivative instrument is created, its fair value (zero at inception) changes. Unfortunately, gains can only be realized by the winner in this zero sum game if the loser does not default.

Editor's Note: To learn more about collateral issues as relates to derivative trading, check out the 2005 ISDA Collateral Guidelines. (ISDA stands for International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.)

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In a recent interview on the John Batchelor show, Globalprivatequity.com, Inc. CEO Doug Miles described the current credit crisis as a "black swan" event. This summer, Miles predicted the valuation fallout associated with complex derivative instruments. Adding that banks can't know the extent of their problems anytime soon, an uncertain interest rate environment, new valuation accounting rules such as FAS 157 and infrequent trading in instruments such as Collateralized Debt Obligations make life very uncomfortable. Click here to listen to the November 11, 2007 interview with John Batchelor and Doug Miles.

In his bestselling book, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, essayist Nassim Nicholas Taleb assigns three attributes to a black swan event in business. "First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable." Click here to read the first chapter, as reprinted by the New York Times on April 22, 2007. In his video interview entitled "Learning to Expect the Unexpected," Taleb describes the human brain as "designed to retain, for efficient storage, past information that fits into a compressed narrative." He adds that "this distortion, called the hindsight bias" makes it difficult to learn from past mistakes.

If true that the sub-prime situation is a black swan as Miles asserts, and taking a page from Taleb, we embrace the notion that we are blind to randomness, what then is the proper role of risk management? According to Financial Week reporter Matthew Quinn, inquiring minds are asking "Where were the risk managers?" He avers that some pundits debate whether technology can keep up with product innovation or adequately assess leverage. He suggests that, even if rocket scientists raise their hand, warnings may go unheeded, especially given banks' dependence on proprietary trading. See "Risk managers return (belatedly) to Street: Chastened banks, brokerages get religion on minimizing exposure to hidden bombs. Coulda, woulda, shoulda?" (Financial Week, November 19, 2007). 

In an article I wrote in mid 2003, I commented that the life of a risk manager is challenging to say the least. In addition to a plethora of data analysis skills, a Chief Risk Officer ("CRO") or someone with similar functional duties must be a diplomat, a motivator and a keen student of human behavior. Most people don't want to hear bad news since it usually means more work for them, not to mention the added stress and the potential damage to one's career of being tainted with a problem. Read "Life in Financial Risk Management: Shrinking Violets Need Not Apply" (AFP Exchange, July/August 2003).

Unfortunately, for retirement plan decision-makers, risk management is going to be impossible to ignore. Pension funds that include allocations to bank stocks or equity in bank-like financial organizations are already feeling the pinch. Plan sponsors who hired bank asset managers or hedge funds/mutual funds that invested in banks are going to be asked tough questions about the due diligence they performed. Did they sufficiently kick the tires with respect to understanding how the banks managed risk? Fiduciaries of banks' 401(k) plans who recommended company stock are getting sued for allegedly having done too little to assess the attendant risks. Just last week, a complaint was filed against the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), citing poor controls that encouraged the acceptance of "risky" loans and inappropriate appraisals of those loans. Click here to read the class action complaint against Freddie Mac.

Black swan or not, the current credit crisis is going to get nastier. Expect many more litigation complaints in the ensuing months.

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In case you missed it a few weeks ago, the Financial Accounting Standards Board voted 4-3 in favor of implementing FAS 157 on time. Ignoring early adopters, FAS 157 takes effect as of November 15, 2007. A company reporting at year-end (or any time after mid November) will be obliged to consider FAS 157. Its companion, FAS 159, allows organizations to "choose to measure many financial instruments and certain other items at fair value."

While "employers’ and plans’ obligations (or assets representing net overfunded positions) for pension benefits, other postretirement benefits (including health care and life insurance benefits)" are excluded from the list of eligible items that can be measured at fair value, plan sponsors are nevertheless impacted by both FAS 157 and FAS 159. 

• If an employer issues stocks or bonds or transacts in other eligible assets and liabilities, FAS 157 and 159 will apply and could, at the enterprise level, indirectly impact pension plan economics.
• If a plan invests in a wide variety of stocks and bonds issued by other reporting entities, fiduciaries will need to fully understand the gap between economic risk and the accounting representation.
• In selecting external money managers, defined benefit and defined contribution plan fiduciaries alike will need to add FAS 157 and FAS 159 questions to their RFPs. Focus on  valuation model selection and testing, choice of inputs and appropriate "level" of three possible categories are a few of the many items to vet.

How FAS 157 relates to existing standards is not known with certainty at this time though FAS 133 accounting for derivative instruments is one affected area. While FAS 133 does not directly apply to a pension plan that trades derivative instruments, as investor, that plan must be savvy enough to access how issuer risk is impacted by new rules.  Consider a hypothetical scenario.

A defined benefit pension plan (Pension Plan Y) hires Bank X as a value-oriented equity portfolio manager. Bank X is a significant user of derivatives and has existing derivative instrument contracts with five different counterparties such a Bank Z, Corporation A and so on. Under FAS 157, Bank X must reflect counterparty risk in assessing fair value. Conceivably, this could result in a FAS 157 fair value for any or all of the five positions held by Bank X that is different enough from the fair value of the "hedged item." The result would be a nullification of favorable hedge accounting treatment for Bank X and reported post FAS 157 earnings that are more volatile. How does Pension Plan Y respond? Do they stop doing work with Bank X because their financial statements make them a higher risk? 

Reporting entities and investors alike are going to have to roll up their shirt sleeves and get to work. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to see the obvious. An incomplete understanding of FAS 157 and 159 lends itself to bad decision-making on the part of plan sponsors. 

Here we go...

Editor's Note: There are many ways to determine FAS 133 hedge effectiveness. If you want copies of selected articles on the topic, click here to send an email. Please include your name and company.) Click here to visit the FASB website to learn more about FAS 157 and 159.

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Investment risk disclosure continues to take center stage. In "Clearing the Financial Fog - Emily Barrett ponders the virtues of transparency" (Wall Street Journal, MarketBeat Blog, September 14, 2007, posted by Tim Annett), the point is made that full disclosure is fraught with problems.

"The trouble with transparency is, there’s just something terribly obscure about it."

"In some ways, banks are already engaged in the clarification process, as more are forced to take back on their books funds previously buried out of regulators’ reach. This includes loans lying around in banks’ warehouses waiting to be chopped up and sold to raise money for private-equity takeovers. A number of bank sponsors of hedge funds have also been forced either to cut credit lines, or, as in the case of Bear Stearns Asset Management, to commit financing to shore them up. But there are limits to how clear banks can be. The complexity of structured finance, which deals in layered bundles of debt, doesn’t lend itself to easy analysis."

“The problem is exposures get buried in different structures,” said Jim Caron, rates strategist at Morgan Stanley. “I don’t think it’s a lack of willingness to get things out to regulators, there’s just a natural lack of transparency in these structures.”

Click here to read the aforementioned post in full.

To be sure, deciding on what and how to provide information is not an easy task. Nevertheless, access to sufficient and meaninful information is vital to good decision-making on the part of institutional investors such as pension funds. Here is the comment I posted.

<< As I’ve written many times (www.pensionriskmatters.com), pension fiduciaries have an obligation to make informed investing decisions. Whether pensions are counterparties to a derivative-related trade (mostly with banks on the other side) or they invest in funds (mutual/hedge/etc) that invest in derivatives, the information they currently get from their trading partners is limited at best. A plan sponsor must understand enough about risk controls and risk drivers for a particular investment/counterparty/asset manager so the investment committee can answer a fundamental question - Are we likely assuming too much risk for the expected payout if we transact with this bank/asset manager? In my view, financial institutions have a golden opportunity to disclose meaningful information about their risk exposures with institutional investor clients, going beyond mandatory requirements. Besides building goodwill, they may be able to attract (and retain) additional assets to manage by fully acknowledging the pension plan’s pain points (need for solid risk information). This does not necessarily translate into providing more information but rather providing “better” information that directly addresses economic risk-taking, and related controls. A joint interview with the portfolio manager and risk manager is one option. Providing the pension plan investor with the bank or asset manager’s risk management policy or statement of risk-taking is another positive gesture. Working with an independent third party to vet risk management process on behalf of the pension plan investor is another possibility. Comment by Susan M. Mangiero - September 18, 2007 at 1:10 pm >>

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While seen by some as a new-fangled name for an old concept ("keep your eye on the liability ball"), liability-driven investing ("LDI") is taking the defined benefit world by storm. Thought by some as a panacea for mismatched assets and liabilities, one type of LDI strategy entails the use of an interest rate swap (or a portfolio of swaps) whereby a plan sponsor receives a cash amount tied to a fixed rate (usually a specified treasury yield plus X basis points). Its obligation as a Floating Rate Payor is determined by the set level of a variable rate benchmark such as the six-month London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR"). Like anything else, there is no free lunch. Besides the collateral a plan sponsor must pledge to the counterparty (such as a major bank), yield curve changes are another factor. Moreover, as LIBOR rises, the plan sponsor must pay more when swap settlement occurs. (This assumes the absence of an interest rate cap that could otherwise create a ceiling as short-term rates climb.) This is exactly what has been happening of late.

According to the Wall Street Journal, ("Libor Pops Up," September 6, 2007), LIBOR has steadily risen over the last few weeks. Even more troubling, its parallel moves with the Fed Funds Rate have been shattered by credit market turmoil. "In normal market conditions, Libor tracks the Federal Funds rate pretty closely, and as recently as July the two were just 13 basis points, or hundredths of a percent, apart. As of Wednesday's close, that gap had grown to nearly 50 basis points, or half a percent. With exposure to the U.S. mortgage market cropping up in seemingly unlikely places, such as banks around Europe, banks that lend at Libor are expressing concern, through the rising rates, that borrowers who appear safe may prove to have something ugly hiding on their balance sheets."

While the British Bankers' Association suggests stability as of September 7, 2007 (due to central bank intervention), one wonders if this can be sustained. After Friday's disappointing jobs number in the U.S. and statements from money folks worldwide ("The credit crunch is only just beginning."), plan sponsors may find themselves exchanging one problem (pension gap) for another (rising short-term rates that drive up swap floating obligations). 

Add market volatility and new regulatory mandates for disclosure to the mix and it's seat belt time for pension fiduciaries with financial decisions to make. Moreover, in "Why Libor Defies Gravity: Divergence of a Key Global Rate Points to Strain" (September 5, 2007), Wall Street Journal reporters Ian McDonald and Alistair MacDonald note that many other short-term rates are actually falling even as LIBOR and related financial instruments struggle. That's cold comfort if a corporate plan sponsor issues commercial paper or borrows via a short-term facility tied to LIBOR.

More to come about an increasingly important topic - LDI and pension financial management.

Editor's Note:

1. Click here to access LIBOR rates from the British Bankers' Association.

2. Click here to access H15 Selected Interest Rates from the Federal Reserve.

3. Click here to read derivative instrument FAQs, courtesy of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.

 

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In "How Street Rode The Risk Ledge And Fell Over," Wall Street Journal reporter Justin Lahart writes that "many lenders, funds and brokerages were following statistical models that grossly underestimated how risky the market environment had become." Warnings about model error or "model risk" are not new. In "Model Risk and Valuation" (Valuation Strategies - March/April 2003), Dr. Susan M. Mangiero, CFA and Accredited Valuation Analyst, suggests possible red flags, adding that the consequences of a poor, inaccurate or incomplete model (or problems with data) can be dire. She adds that what constitutes a "good" model is likewise important to assess. This is sometimes made more difficult when inputs themselves must be modeled. For example, in the case of derivatives related to credit risk or mortgage loans (dominating headlines of late), estimating variables such as prepayment or recovery rates is an important precursor to any valuation of the derivative instrument itself. Email us if you would like articles about model risk and valuation.

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The RiskMetrics Group and Susan Mangiero, author of Risk Management for Pensions, Endowments and Foundations, are pleased to present an introductory course on Investment Risk Management for Pension Funds. The two and a half day workshop addresses investment risk measurement and valuation fundamentals, along with an overview of new pension rules and regulations as they relate to procedural prudence. Combining lectures, cases and lab work, plan sponsors will learn about risk management standards, how to apply various risk assessment techniques and what to avoid in creating and implementing a risk management plan.

Who should attend: chief investment officers, portfolio managers, corporate governance officers, chief risk officers, trustees, risk analysts and board members

Instructor: Dr. Susan Mangiero, CFA, AIFA, AVA, and FRM, President and CEO Pension Governance, LLC.

Dates:
Wednesday- Friday, September 12-14, 2007

Time:
September 12-13 - 9:00 am - 5:00 pm
September 14 - 9:00 am - 12 noon

Location:
RiskMetrics office
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
44th Floor
NY, NY 10005

Email education@riskmetrics.com to register for the course or to obtain additional information about cost or content. 

Space is limited so, please reserve your space today.

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Summertime and the livin' may be easy for Porgy and Bess. If you're an investor caught in the middle of a scorching hot credit meltdown, things are far from tranquil. Besides the fact that many deals are being put on hold (thereby reducing the universe of available stocks and bonds), more than a few asset managers are reporting giant write-downs. If you haven't seen it, the Wall Street Journal's list of affected deals and organizations is sobering. Click here to read "Scorecard: Debt Dilemmas - How Credit-Market Tremors Have Affected Junk Bonds, LBOs and Hedge Funds."

Jittery traders are starting to wonder how quickly sub-prime loan problems will spread to other market sectors, ultimately impacting the ability of corporations and individuals to borrow and spend. In "Strategies correlate after credit market crunch hits," Financial Times reporters Peter Garnham and Paul J. Davies describe changing patterns across markets and strategies. What does this mean for institutional investors? Quite simply, a lot.

Hedge funds and private equity managers who tout absolute return (based on uncorrelated return patterns) are going to have a tough challenge ahead if convergence occurs. Defined benefit plan sponsors are going to have no less a difficult time.

Strategic asset allocations are going to be directly (and arguably materially) impacted by the notion that "the investment world is getting smaller." To read an earlier post about contagion, click here to access "Pension Contagion - Should We Worry?"

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According to Wall Street Journal  reporters Kate Kelly, Liam Pleven and James R. Hagerty, at least ten funds struggle with sub-prime loan woes in the form of diminished portfolio values. As if that isn't bad enough, some institutional investors are being given the unhappy news that withdrawals are suspended. For pension funds in search of liquidity, look elsewhere. (See "Wall Street, Bear Stearns Hit Again By Investors Fleeing Mortgage Sector," Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2007.)

As the fallout continues, with no end in sight, it is worth repeating that fiduciaries are on the hook for creating, and then following, a prudent process with respect to investment selection. ERISA itself mandates that employee benefit plan fiduciaries must carry out their duties in the sole interest of the plan's participants and with the "care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."

These few words speak volumes about the many things a plan sponsor must consider before committing money to a particular instrument, strategy or asset manager. Questions naturally arise. A few of them are shown below.

1. Have plan sponsors sufficiently queried asset managers about how they measure default risk ?

2. How are structured financial transactions collateralized?

3. Who is responsible for collateral management?

4. What safeguards exist to enforce collateral quality and amount?

5. Do asset managers make their policies and procedures available to plan sponsors who want to know more about valuation, operational controls, collateral issues and trading limits?

6. Are positions being marked to model?

7. Who reviews the integrity of the model and related data inputs?

8. What could cause estimated default risk to rise for "questionable" borrowers and how are asset managers tracking identified risk drivers?

9. What are the investors' rights to withdraw funds?

10. Does an asset manager reserve any capital against its expected risk exposure, voluntarily or otherwise?

Several observations are in order. First, investment problems are not unique to small funds. To the contrary, some large mortgage-related funds (in terms of assets) are currently in crisis mode. Second, recent market drops and rising credit spreads are forcing companies to delay IPOs or incur higher costs of capital. This means that all investors are invariably impacted. Third, the fallout is global, with several prominent non-U.S. funds announcing big hits.

This may be the beginning of the end for easy credit and the start of a "brave new world" for plan sponsors who cannot afford a "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil" approach.

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Hedge funds are increasingly being used as part of a pension’s liability-driven investing (“LDI”) strategy or to potentially diversify a portfolio. At the same time, several recent hedge fund blow-ups, along with their prominent presence in corporate boardrooms via activist investing, has regulators and institutional investors more than a little concerned. Pension fiduciaries must demonstrate a rigorous due diligence in their selection process or risk breach of duty allegations. 

In an effort to assist plan sponsors, Pension Governance, LLC continues its Hedge Fund Toolbox^SM series with two more online events this week. Join pension decision-makers for an engaging and timely discussion about the use of leverage, derivatives and financial risk controls (July 10, 2007) and operational risk (July 12, 2007).

According to series creator, Dr. Susan M. Mangiero, CFA, Accredited Valuation Analyst, Financial Risk Manager and Accredited Investment Fiduciary Analyst, "There is a sea change underway with respect to the use of hedge funds by pension plans. While increased monies to alternative fund managers may make perfect sense in some situations, a lack of understanding about financial and trading risks could spell disaster for retirement plans. We help plan sponsors interview a hedge fund’s risk manager as a more complete gauge of potential problems. If that function does not exist, that could be a red flag. However, the existence of a risk management function in and of itself does not mean that it is an effective safeguard against runaway losses. Personal and professional fiduciary liability exposure, duty to oversee and an increasingly complex investment landscape makes this a particularly challenging time for plan sponsors.” President of Pension Governance, LLC, Mangiero adds that "Our goal is to help fiduciaries with research, process checks and training to thwart trouble and help to promote best practices."

For more information, click here. Recordings of all six webinars are available for a modest fee to non-subscribers. To order past webinars, click here.

Pension Governance, LLC is registered with CFA Institute as an Approved Provider of professional development programs. Each program qualifies for 1.5 PD credits.

About Pension Governance, LLC:
Pension Governance, LLC (www.pensiongovernance.com) is an independent research, analysis, training and publishing company, emphasizing investment fiduciary risk management. Covered topics include fee structure, liability-driven investing, controls, valuation, alternatives and fiduciary best practices for board members, CFOs, treasurers and their attorneys, consultants and banks.

Media Sponsors:
Pension Governance, LLC is proud to have Albourne Village, Hedgeco.net, Lipper Hedge World, and the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts as media sponsors.

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Since the mid 1600's, tulips have come to symbolize economic bubbles. Excess demand for the floral beauties led Dutchmen to pay a hefty price, resulting in the tulip mania of the early 17th century.

One wonders if a June 24 article by New York Times reporter Gretchen Morgenson hadn't been inspired by this tale of yore. Entitled "When Models Misbehave," this prize-winning business columnist describes the challenges of assessing securities that trade in relatively illiquid markets. In the absence of ready buyers and sellers, traders mark to model, making assumptions about the future behavior of inputs such as interest rates. Unfortunately, problems may arise if the underlying assumptions make no sense. Consider the notion that past is prologue. Referring to the sub-prime debacle currently plaguing several large financial institutions, Morgenson describes 2006 and 2007 lending practices as overly generous and likely to tighten. Correctly recognizing that future supply-demand conditions for credit might change leads to an altogether different model outcome.

Lack of independence or "the fantasy that a firm's principals prefer" is another concern. Blind acceptance of model-generated outputs as gospel could mean a subsequent, and arguably tainted, outlay of serious money to other trades.

Morgenson has a good point.

It's easy to be lulled into false security with computer-generated numbers. Unfortunately, bad values beget bad economics. A computational flaw, unstable or inappropriate model and/or low-integrity data could end up costing investors millions of dollars. Trading decisions based on garbage are expensive mistakes.

Good model-building is a start. Validating, testing, revising and testing anew should follow. Heady stuff but anything else might be considered remiss. Importantly, it's up to investors to query asset managers about what's inside the black box.

Anecdotally, I'm not sure there is enough of this rigorous oversight happening right now. As an accredited appraiser, I'm disturbed by the laxity of investigation about valuation and the related process of risk management.

With new accounting rules on their way, we'll talk much more about models and model risk in future posts. In the meantime, click here if you'd like us to send you information about valuation and modeling.

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In case you missed it, here is the link to a video of my appearance on CNBC's Morning Call.  While I concede that it's impossible to have an in-depth conversation in only a few minutes, several things are worth mentioning as a result of the May 17 chat with host Mr. Mark Haines.

1. Not all institutional investors have a large staff to vet different investment ideas. Moreover, large does not always mean better. Witness Fannie Mae and Amaranth Advisors. "Thorough" is the watch word.

2. If considering a hedge fund, ask if the fund has a functional risk manager who monitors, tests and reviews policies for financial and operational trouble spots. Does that person have independence and authority to effect meaningful change?

3. I believe the other speaker in this segment said that private equity avoids having to deal with the daily volatility of being invested in public equities. Caution - The absence of a ready trading market does not necessarily mean that there is less risk. Some could easily assert the opposite. Private equity deals, because they are private, entail valuation challenges, difficulty in liquidating ownership interests and so on.

4. The use of correlation (a measure of linear association) to gauge diversification benefits depends on having good data for all relevant time periods. If using an inappropriately long calendar period (example: last ten years), output may reflect a smoothing out effect which therefore underestimates "true" volatility.

5. There is much more to say on the topics of risk management and valuation!

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At a time when pension funds explore new ways to buoy funding, billions of dollars are being allocated to hedge funds and fund of funds. Either direct or part of a portable alpha strategy, alternative investments offer potential benefits but often bring new challenges in the form of multi-tiered fees, valuation, leverage, transparency, short-selling, illiquidity and operational risk. Add to the mix the mandates of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and one thing is clear. Pension fiduciaries are on the hook to demonstrate a solid understanding of the structural and financial characteristics of hedge funds and fund of funds and what could potentially cause problems if left unchecked.

To help pension decision-makers better understand this important area, Pension Governance, LLC has created the Hedge Fund Toolbox^SM – a series of six webinars that focus on hedge fund economics, operations and legal considerations. Webinars are scheduled as follows:

•Hedge Fund Fees, Performance and Transparency (June 14, 2007)
•Hedge Fund Documentation, Background Checks, Enforcement and Litigation (June 19, 2007)
•Role of Consultants and Financial Advisors in Selecting Hedge Funds (June 26, 2007)
•Hedge Fund Valuation, Use of Side Pockets and New Accounting Rules (June 28, 2007)
•Hedge Fund Leverage, Use of Derivatives and Risk Management (July 10, 2007)
•Hedge Fund Operational Risk (July 12, 2007)

Register to attend the entire series or individual webinars. If you miss an event, recordings will be available for a modest fee for non-subscribers. Webinars are free to all Pension Governance subscribers. For more information, go to http://www.pensiongovernance.com/webinars.php?PageId=58&PageSubId=59.

About Pension Governance, LLC:
Pension Governance, LLC (www.pensiongovernance.com) is an independent research and analysis company that focuses on benefit plan related investment risk, corporate strategy, valuation and accounting issues, with the fiduciary perspective in mind. Pension Governance, LLC is registered with CFA Institute as an Approved Provider of professional development programs.

Media Sponsors:
Pension Governance, LLC is proud to have Albourne Village (www.albournevillage.com), Hedgeco.net (www.hedgeco.net) and the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts (www.nacva.com) as media sponsors.

Contacts:
Pension Governance, LLC
Susan M. Mangiero, 203-261-5519
Ph.D., CFA, AIFA, AVA, FRM
PG-Info@pensiongovernance.com

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According to various press reports, in his conversation with Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, CEO Warren Buffett reiterated his concern about the use of derivatives, "saying that excessive borrowing by traders, investors and corporations will eventually lead to significant dislocation in the financial markets. In fielding a question Saturday about derivatives, which he once referred to as "financial weapons of mass destruction," Mr. Buffett told shareholders that he expects derivatives and borrowing, or leverage, would inevitably end in huge losses for many financial participants." He further added that "The introduction of derivatives has totally made any regulation of margin requirements a joke." (See "World According to Buffett: How Media, Oil -- Among Others -- Matter" by Karen Richardson, Wall Street Journal," May 7, 2007.)

We've written about derivatives many times and will continue to do so. (I've even written an entire book on the topic.)

Derivatives are everywhere in pension land. Defined benefit plans consider liability-driven investing and portable alpha strategies (often entailing the use of derivatives). On the DC side, qualified default investment alternatives sometimes involve futures, options and/or swaps. Hedging company stock in 401(k) plans might rely on the use of derivatives. Many external money managers employ derivatives and pension fiduciaries are responsible for vetting their risk process and procedures.

So the pivotal question is whether derivatives are a hindrance or a help. Certainly a market that topples $400 trillion in global size reflects widespread popularity. Like anything else, however, fiduciaries who don't understand the incremental risks are putting themselves in harm's way.

Much more to come!

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According to the New York Stock Exchange Fact Book, pension ownership now accounts for nearly twenty-five cents of every equity dollar. No surprise then that the governance movement is alive and well and ensuring that forthcoming talks about proxy reform receive wide attention.

Part of the SEC's roundtable discussions about voting reform, various institutional investors, attorneys and governance experts will meet on May 7 to talk about topics such as shareholder rights under state law, whether investors should be able to exert more influence over corporate management and the role of the SEC in overseeing the proxy process. Click here to access the full agenda and list (and bios) of speakers. Subsequent meetings will take place later this month.

At a time when large shareholders crave more power over issues such as executive pay, corporate social responsibility and proper financial disclosure, a meaningful conversation is welcome.

On a related note, the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) concluded its first International Auditor Regulatory Institute on May 4, 2007. With representatives from over forty countries assembling to discuss how the PCAOB handles Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 compliance, chairman Mark Olson extols the notion of global oversight.

Also in the news, BDO Seidman's "Financial Reporting" letter (dated May 2007) is replete with question lists for shareholders. Organized by topic such as board composition, audit committees, preparation of financial statements, management's strategic plans and business ethics, the publication is easy to understand and serves as a useful guide.  The sub-list on risk management emphasizes company-wide issues, including, but not limited to, topics such as the role of the board in developing a risk management system and the choice of risk management techniques to evaluate "the adequacy and cost effectiveness of insured risks." Questions related to derivatives and financial risk are shown below (excerpted verbatim from the BDO document). Click here for the full text publication.

1. Does the company use enterprise risk management?
2. What is the company's attitude towards financial risk?
3. Were there any significant foreign currency exchange gains or losses in 2006 and in interim 2007 operations?
4. What is the company doing to minimize the impact of changes in foreign currency rates?
5. Does the company hedge its foreign currency exposures?
6. What types of financial instruments and derivatives does the company use?
7. What are the major risks from the company's use of financial instruments or derivatives (e.g. options, futures, forwards, caps, collars, interest rate swaps)?
8. Does the company have written guidelines and policies on the use of financial instruments and derivative instruments?
9. Who formulated those policies?
10. Did the board of directors approve those policies?
11. Do management and the board of directors monitor the company's financial instruments and derivatives exposures?
12. Is there a limit system in place (i.e. a system that sets the maximum amount of loss the company would tolerate before liquidating a position)?

PG Editor's Note: We are (and will continue to) address many of these issues online. Visit www.pensiongovernance.com. Also watch for our soon-to-be published newsletter about the use of derivatives, investment fiduciary risk, financial statement analysis and so much more. Pension Risk Alert^SM will examine risk and valuation issues from a "how-to" perspective. Email us if you want to be notified about the availability of this informative newsletter.

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Continuing to exhibit meteoric growth, the global derivatives market is now estimated at around $400 trillion. That's a lot of zeros - $400,000,000,000,000. In contrast, the CIA World Fact Book estimates 2006 Gross World Product at $65 trillion. Said another way, aggregate economic production for the entire world has an approximate dollar value of only 1/6th the estimated market size for futures, options, swaps and various combinations.

Is it any wonder then that regulators  are asking questions about who does what in the world of derivatives? One false move and the intricate web of financial institutions which dominate derivatives trading could fall apart. Increased volatility for the market as a whole or an exogenous shock to a particular sector potentially spells trouble.

In her April 4, 2007 article, Wall Street Journal reporter Eleanor Laise writes that "automated trading of derivatives and increased use by fast-growing hedge funds have helped make the market more accessible to mutual funds" and that "mutual funds aim to stand out in a crowded field." She further points out that identifying the use of derivatives by portfolio managers requires a hard look at the fund's prospectus. I'd emphatically add that reading what is available is seldom sufficient. To the contrary, a pension fiduciary needs to ask a myriad of questions of and about the mutual fund manager. Here are a few suggestions from a long list. (Email me if you want additional information.)

1. Who determines the type of permitted derivative instruments and strategies, and on what basis?

2. Does the fund or family of funds have a risk manager? If so, does he or she have the authority to make meaningful decisions about risk controls? Who does that person report to?

3. How are mutual fund traders compensated with respect to return, risk and risk-adjusted return?

4. Is there a risk management policy (and related procedures) that can be reviewed before investing? If considered proprietary, is it possible to meet with the portfolio manager and/or risk manager to discuss?

5. What types of risk metrics are employed by the mutual fund?

6. Who authorizes derivatives-related trading limits, and on what basis?

7. Are the fund's auditors comfortable with how the derivative instruments are marked-to-market?

8. Does the portfolio manager rely on an external system to anal